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Austerity and the Rise of the Nazi Party
GreGori Galofré-Vilà, Christopher M. Meissner,  
Martin MCKee, and daVid stuCKler
We study the link between fiscal austerity and Nazi electoral success. Voting 
data from a thousand districts and a hundred cities for four elections between 
1930 and 1933 show that areas more affected by austerity (spending cuts and tax 
increases) had relatively higher vote shares for the Nazi Party. We also find that 
the localities with relatively high austerity experienced relatively high suffering 
(measured by mortality rates) and these areas’ electorates were more likely to vote 
for the Nazi Party. Our findings are robust to a range of specifications including 
an instrumental variable strategy and a border-pair policy discontinuity design. 
In 1928, the German Nazi Party earned just over 2 percent of the votes in the general federal elections. By mid-1932, it had received 38 percent of 
votes in the national elections, becoming the largest political party in the 
Reichstag. How did this shift to the extreme far-right happen so quickly? 
Economic factors, such as high unemployment associated with the Great 
Depression, sociocultural issues, and the excessively punitive Treaty of 
Versailles, are well studied. They undoubtedly played an important role 
in the rise of the Nazi Party. Still, the rapid growth of support for the Nazi 
Party well into the Great Depression remains the subject of considerable 
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debate (Eichengreen 2018; Ferguson 1996; James 1986; Satayanth et al. 
2017; Temin 1990; Voth 2020).
In this paper, we investigate the association between the austerity 
measures implemented by the German government between 1930 and 
1932 and voters’ increased support for the Nazi Party. A growing liter-
ature studies the interactions between political preferences and fiscal 
policy with evidence that austerity packages are correlated with rising 
extremism (Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi 2019; Bor 2017; Eichengreen 
2015, 2018; Fetzer 2019; Ponticelli and Voth 2020). It stands to reason 
that the austerity measures implemented in Germany in the early 1930s 
played a role. However, we are aware of no direct quantitative assess-
ment of this issue for the Weimar Republic. 
During this period, Heinrich Brüning of the Center Party, and 
Germany’s chancellor between March 1930 and May 1932, implemented 
a set of measures via executive decree in order to balance the country’s 
finances. These austerity measures included real cuts in spending and 
transfers as well as higher tax rates. Brüning believed that the conse-
quent suffering would be highly visible, thereby eliciting international 
sympathy for the Germans and helping put an end to the unpopular repa-
rations imposed at Versailles (Evans 2003).
To test the hypothesis that austerity can explain increased Nazi vote 
share, we use city and district-level election returns for the federal elec-
tions of 1930, 1932 (July and November), and 1933. We then link local 
vote shares to different proxies for city, district, and state-level fiscal 
policy changes while also controlling for other potential explanations 
for the rise of the Nazis, such as unemployment, changes in wages, 
and economic output. Our results are robust to inclusion of a number 
of different controls and specifications including city-level time trends, 
state by year fixed effects, and electoral district by year fixed effects. 
The observational data we use to study austerity and extremism have a 
number of features that enable us to overcome obvious issues of reverse 
causality and endogeneity. Brüning’s policies on spending and taxes 
were not expected. Instead, they became an outcome of the unexpectedly 
severe economic and financial crisis. They were decided at the Reich 
level by Brüning and his cabinet with implicit support of the Reichstag. 
Spending cuts and tax increases were uniformly applied across the nation 
so that the policy decisions were exogenous to the preferences of specific 
cities and districts. As noted by Balderston (1993, p. 225), “the progres-
sive ‘nationalization’ of taxing and spending decisions, justifies historians 
in the responsibility they place on the Brüning cabinet and on Brüning 
personally, for the fiscal balance during the slump.”
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Limits on spending and on changes to taxes, policy variables often 
formerly controlled by local authorities, were also imposed. Successive 
pay cuts to national civil service salaries are an example. Although some 
expenditure cuts were out of the hands of localities and mandated by the 
national government, some budget categories were hit harder than others. 
This fact means that nationally imposed budget cuts might have differential 
impacts on localities depending on the predetermined patterns of spending 
and reliance on the national government for transfers to fund different cate-
gories of spending. We use city-level variation in the preausterity reliance 
on Reich transfers and national changes in transfers as a shift-share instru-
mental variable for subsequent spending declines. Since states, localities, 
and the central government were unable to borrow on international capital 
markets after 1930 (Schuker 1988), localities were forced by markets to 
traverse the depression with highly disruptive fiscal shocks.
As for taxes, a similar logic applies. The Reich maintained control 
over a number of specific taxes, determining, for example, the statutory 
marginal rates for income taxes and corporation turnover taxes. Changes 
to the statutory marginal rates applied equally and evenly to all states and 
localities, but lower brackets had higher percentage increases in income 
tax rates (Newcomer 1936). We use variation at the local level in the 
initial distribution of taxable income across tax brackets and national 
changes in tax policy to instrument for the austerity-driven tax hikes. To 
make identification valid, we need to avoid confounding our fiscal shock 
with an unobservable economic shock correlated with income distribu-
tion. On the income distribution, Dell (2007) and Gómez-León and de 
Jong (2019) show that Gini coefficients and top income shares were 
fairly constant between 1928 and 1933.
Higher Nazi vote share could be because of resentment arising from 
distributional battles for slices of the fiscal pie in difficult times. There is 
clearly a distributional component to these changes, the percentage rise 
in tax rates being much higher for the lower income brackets. Wueller 
(1933) also discusses that while tax revenue had traditionally been 
retained where it was collected, intrastate redistribution was increasingly 
becoming need based during the Depression. 
We also use a number of different econometric specifications to elimi-
nate further concerns about endogeneity. We employ both city/district 
fixed effects models and long differences to focus on within-locality varia-
tion in Nazi support. We are also able to circumscribe the control group by 
matching districts to neighboring districts just across state borders, as in 
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010). While relevant observables were spatially 
smooth, fiscal policy across the state borders was sharply different because 
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state policies responded to statewide concerns. With this identification 
strategy, we are also able to control for common economic shocks corre-
lated with the initial characteristics of localities by using period by district-
pair fixed effect interaction terms. Even after controlling for local economic 
shocks between 1930 and 1932 in this way, austerity remains a statistically, 
economically, and politically significant determinant of Nazi vote share.
We also provide some novel quantitative estimates concerning the 
channels by which austerity mattered. To do so, we study the relation-
ship between mortality rates and austerity. We find a plausible link, 
since where public spending on health care dropped more, mortality was 
higher. These places also saw a relatively large increase in Nazi support 
at the polls. Finally, looking at archival documents of Nazi propaganda, 
we document how Nazi leaders invoked austerity to attack Brüning and 
the Weimar Republic and how Brüning’s tax rises were seen as ineffi-
cient and unfair by the German masses.
Even though there has been a German debate on whether there was 
an alternative to austerity (Borchardt 1980; Büttner 1989; Ritschl 1998; 
Voth 1993) and speculation that austerity played a role in the rise of the 
Nazi Party, to our knowledge, no previous research has directly tested the 
quantitative impact and the channels by which fiscal austerity mattered. 
Falter, Lindenberger, and Schumann (1986), Frey and Weck (1981), King 
et al. (2008), and Stögbauer and Komlos (2004) studied the economic 
shocks of the period, but they did not use fiscal data and the transmission 
mechanisms emphasized are different from ours. Previous work focused 
on a direct channel from lower disposable incomes and unemployment to 
frustration at the polls. On global comparisons, one study evaluated the 
impact of the Great Depression and austerity on voting patterns in 171 
elections in 28 countries (Bromhead, Eichengreen, and O’Rourke 2013) 
and another looked at the European level (Ponticelli and Voth 2020). Yet, 
these have not considered the particular context of Weimar Germany.
Regarding the connection between political competition and differential 
effects of the crisis, the literature notes that the lowest status groups and the 
unemployed turned to the Communists (Falter, Lindenberger, and Schumann 
1986; King et al. 2008) but those just above in the economic hierarchy, who 
had more to lose from the tax hikes and spending cuts, seemed to favor 
the Nazis. Between 1930 and 1933 the Nazis gained votes from all walks 
of life. Yet, Evans (2003), Falter, Lindenberger, and Schumann (1986), 
King et al. (2008), and Voigtländer and Voth (2019) have documented how 
the party was “underrepresented” among the working classes, in industrial 
cities, and in Catholic regions. We control for these fixed factors and allow 
for interactions between them and our measures of austerity.
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Our baseline results show that Brüning’s austerity had a sizable effect. 
Each one-standard-deviation increase in austerity was associated with 
between one quarter to one half of one standard deviation of the depen-
dent variable. In localities where austerity was more severe, Nazi vote 
share was significantly higher. Our novel use of within-locality variation 
in the size of the fiscal shock sheds light on the local and national experi-
ence of democratic decline.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
provide a detailed account of the main existing explanations for the rise 
of the Nazis. The third and fourth sections, respectively, review how 
austerity was implemented and present the historical context of the 
different elections in Germany between 1930 and 1933. In the fifth and 
sixth sections, we show our main results and robustness checks for the 
city- and district-level outcomes using spending and tax data. The final 
section concludes. 
COMPETING EXPLANATIONS
There are many competing explanations for the stark rise of the Nazi 
Party in Weimar Germany. The conventional explanation is the impact 
of the Great Depression. Those hit hardest by the economic downturn 
held the incumbent parties responsible for their situation, punishing them 
by voting for the Nazi Party. Economic activity peaked in Germany in 
1928, driven by a sharp downturn in investment (Ritschl 2002; Temin 
1971). Later, the cessation of capital inflows and a crisis in the German 
banking sector culminated in a slowdown in the growth of credit, while 
other international shocks prolonged the downturn. Yet, the unwilling-
ness of the Reichsbank to stop the deflation mattered but cannot neces-
sarily explain regional variation in Nazi support.
A similar point could be made with respect to the increasing numbers 
of unemployed workers, soaring from 1.4 million in 1928 to 5.6 million 
in 1932. Unemployment also reached very high levels in other countries, 
such as the United States, around that time, without being accompanied 
by electoral radicalization (Eichengreen and Hatton 1988). Additionally, 
the unemployed were more likely to vote for the Communist Party or 
the Social Democrats (in Protestant precincts) rather than the Nazi Party 
(Evans 2003; King et al. 2008), as the Communist Party was perceived as 
the party that traditionally represented workers’ interests.
A third explanation invokes resentment about high debt repayments 
imposed on Germany in the Treaty of Versailles. These debts initially 
totaled up to 260 percent of 1913 GDP (Ferguson 1997; Ritschl 2013). 
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Although France and Britain had war debt burdens similar to Germany, 
the Versailles agreements treated Germany as a conquered enemy, 
forcing it to pay a large share of the allies’ costs of the war. This placed 
financial demands on Germany that were very difficult to meet and that 
were dubbed as “cruel” by some (Keynes 1920; Temin and Vines 2014). 
However, Germany’s war debts were never completely paid (Galofré-
Vilà et al. 2019). German war debts were postponed in the Hoover mora-
torium of 1931 or temporarily suspended in the Lausanne Conference a 
year later.1
Fiscal austerity might simply have been a driver of economic collapse if 
multipliers were large enough, but Ritschl (2013) reports that these were 
small. If austerity mattered, it must have been something about the unique 
way Germany experienced it. Even if austerity did not have a contrac-
tionary effect on aggregate demand, it still might have had distributional 
consequences that, in turn, affected how people voted. Austerity not only 
hurt the lower middle classes and elites, by increasing tax rates on profits 
and income, but ostensibly also had a major impact on people’s welfare 
by cutting key social spending lines after 1929. Brüning was commonly 
known as the “Hunger Chancellor,” stressing how these budget cuts 
threatened living conditions. There is, in fact, some qualitative consensus 
on Brüning’s devastating legacy. Feinstein, Temin, and Toniolo (2008, p. 
90) opine that “Brüning introduced a succession of austerity decrees. The 
descent was cumulative and catastrophic.” Several authors also noted 
that austerity could have contributed to political extremism. For instance, 
Feldman (2005, p. 494) comments that “Brüning’s reliance on emergency 
decrees had paved the way for a right-wing rule” and Eichengreen (2015, 
p. 139) that “Brüning’s unrelenting austerity, by plunging the economy 
deeper into recession, increased political polarization.”
Hitler also viewed austerity as a springboard to power. Twelve days 
after Brüning enacted his fourth and last emergency decree, Hitler issued 
a mass pamphlet titled The Great Illusion of the Last Emergency Decree. 
He concluded the letter saying that “Although that was not the intention, 
this emergency decree will help my party to victory, and therefore put 
an end to the illusions of the present system.” There are also attacks on 
Brüning’s cabinet on earlier fiscal plans. For instance, in October 1931, 
Hitler wrote an Open Letter from Adolf Hitler to the Reich Chancellor in 
1 Other explanations invoke the Weimar Republic’s electoral system, where each party was 
allotted a number of seats in the Reichstag proportional to the votes received, which cleared the 
path for small parties to enter the Reichstag (Jepsen 1953). Historians also stress the animosity 
between the two major parties of the left and difficulties in building lasting coalitions. However, 
Evans (2003) notes that proportional representation did not, in fact, encourage the rise of the 
extreme right and alternative electoral systems might have given the Nazi Party even more seats. 
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which he asked, “Where has the hereby-reduced number of unemployed 
been left? Where are the successes of the ‘rescue of agriculture’? And 
when, Mister Chancellor Brüning, did the then-promised reduction of 
taxes finally begin?”
These pamphlets also made promises to relax the budget constraint 
if the Nazis were elected. For instance, on May 1932, a pamphlet titled 
Emergency Economic Program of the NSDAP offered “fundamental 
improvements in agriculture in general, multiple years of taxation exemp-
tion for the settlers, cheap loans and the creation of markets by improving 
transportation routes, and making them less expensive.” On the welfare 
system, “National Socialism will do all it can to maintain the social insur-
ance system, which has been driven to collapse by the present System.” 2
AUSTERITY AND THE GERMAN ELECTIONS
In March 1930, Brüning was appointed as German Chancellor by 
President von Hindenburg and fiscal reforms were quickly implemented, 
with a first austerity plan in July 1930. Austerity was implemented 
by emergency decree under Article 48 of the constitution, with the 
Reichstag eventually consenting without formal debate. From its begin-
ning, austerity was highly unpopular, leading von Hindenburg to dissolve 
the Reichstag and call new elections.3
In the elections of September 1930, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), 
the political home of the worker movement, remained as the largest party 
in the Reichstag (yet, moving from 29.8 percent of the total votes in May 
1928 to 24.5 percent in 1930). The Center Party, which was Brüning’s 
party, also started to lose popularity (moving from 12.1 to 11.8 percent), 
and the Communist Party, the main party of protest for those workers 
disenchanted by the Weimar regime, somewhat managed to collect new 
votes (moving from 10.6 to 13.1 percent). The German National People’s 
Party (DNVP), a bourgeois, xenophobic far-right party that shared many 
of the Nazi’s extremist views, declined from 14.2 percent of total votes 
to 7 percent. Above all these changes, support of the Nazi Party surged 
from almost no support to more than 6 million voters (moving from less 
than 3 percent to 18.3 percent).
2 There is also evidence that austerity formed part of Goebbels’ propaganda machine. For 
instance, in a speech on 2 May 1931 at the Reichstag, Goebbels very prominently also alluded to 
tax pressure on the middle class (Goebbels 1931). We thank Hans-Joachim Voth for calling this 
speech to our attention.
3 Eichengreen (2018, p. 86) notes, “that the most dramatic cuts were imposed by decree, 
circumventing normal legislative deliberation, did not foster popular admiration of the politicians 
then in office or enhance the legitimacy of the constitutional system.”
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Although austerity was only implemented some months in advance, 
the September 1930 election was a key turning point in German history 
because it was seen as a withering verdict against austerity—a message 
that went unheeded. As discussed by Temin (1990, p. 82), “…it is clear 
that the vote of 1930 was a resounding rejection of Brüning’s policies 
at an early stage.” Initially, only the Nazis (and, to some extent, the 
Communists) campaigned against austerity, with the DNVP struggling to 
find a coherent response on the austerity front. For instance, Fulda (2009, 
p. 158) noted that for the first emergency decree, “the parliamentary 
DNVP was split: while Hugenberg’s followers voted against it, the group 
around Westarp decided to support it.” He also comments that when 
“the tension between the pro-Brüning DNVP parliamentarians around 
Westarp and Hugenberg’s supporters increased… Goebbels noted in his 
diary that the DNVP was ‘finished’: ‘All grist to our mill.’”4 As for the 
SPD, Brüning’s memoirs highlight that he often turned to members of the 
SPD for support. Successive emergency decrees in June 1931, October 
1931, and December 1931 raised nearly all of the main taxes controlled 
by the Reich (income, wage, turnover, excise duties, tariffs), put limits on 
spending, introduced exclusions from unemployment and relief benefits, 
and mandated civil service pay cuts (over 50 percent of the state-level 
spending bill according to Balderston (1993)).
By the end of May 1932, Brüning was removed from the Chancellorship 
and was replaced by von Papen. The elections of July 1932 boosted Nazi 
popularity even more, achieving 37.3 percent of the votes. Yet, the Nazis 
lacked an overall majority at the Reichstag and von Papen continued 
as Chancellor. In the second half of 1932, von Papen signaled the end 
of austerity and started to introduce some stimulus packages, involving 
employment programs, tax credits, and subsidies for new employment 
and public works projects (Evans 2003; Feinstein, Temin, and Toniolo 
2008). Despite the fact that any short-lived effect was modest in magni-
tude compared to the cumulative effect of Brüning’s austerity, the easing 
of austerity, along with the ostensible cancellation of war debts at the 
Lausanne conference and an improved economic environment,5 coin-
cided with a decline in Nazi vote share in the elections of November 1932 
(collecting 33.1 percent of the votes). As O’Rourke (2010) comments, 
“by this stage Brüning was gone, his successor adopted some modestly 
4 By July 1930, the DNVP was split in two parties, with Westarp’s followers founding the 
Konservative Volkspartei (supporting Brüning’s government) and the rest, commanded by 
Hugenberg, radicalized and tried to approach the Nazi Party.
5 Between 1932 and 1933, real GDP grew by 6 percent. By comparison, real GDP fell by 8 
percent between 1931 and 1932.
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stimulative policies, and there were signs of a partial recovery. Not coin-
cidentally, in November 1932 the Nazi share dipped to 33.1 percent; but 
by then it was too late, and the Weimar Republic was doomed.” 
Von Papen had virtually no support in the Reichstag, and in an ill-fated 
attempt to increase his support, he called for new elections in November 
of 1932. Yet, given mass discontent and social instabilities, later on, 
Hindenburg appointed Schleicher of the DNVP as Chancellor.6 He lasted 
for less than two months. Adolf Hitler was appointed chancellor on 30 
January ahead of the decisive elections of March 1933, where the Nazi 
Party became the largest party (with 44 percent of the votes) and built 
a bare working majority with the DNVP that offered 8 percent of the 
votes.7 These were the last elections of the Weimar Republic and were 
tarnished by violence and intimidation and might not be regarded as free 
and democratic.
Under Brüning’s mandate, there was a process of centralizing fiscal 
policy and the national government began to limit the ability of states 
to raise tax rates as well limited fiscal transfers to states and localities 
(Balderston 1993).8 James (1986, p. 76) also commented that regional 
governments were “left with odious taxes and falling revenues.” Although 
austerity was determined at the Reich level, the extent to which it mattered 
varied regionally. This variation depended on how lower levels of govern-
ment allocated their revenue to different types of expenditure and what 
the sources of their tax revenues were. Around 40 percent of the spending 
cuts were implemented by local authorities, mainly municipalities and 
the so-called administrative divisions (Regierungsbezirke); 22 percent by 
the different states; and around one-third by the Reich (Newcomer 1936). 
Hence, the impact of Reich mandated cuts on the states varied according 
to a number of predetermined fixed factors, including population and 
land area, number of schools, highway mileage, and the distribution of 
income (Newcomer 1936, p. 205).9
6 Schleicher also introduced some public works programs.
7 In the election of 1933, the DNVP presented in the elections as part of a coalition the 
Kampffront Schwarz-Weiß-Rot, which was an electoral alliance of three parties: the DNVP, the 
Stahlhelm, and Landbund.
8 There were two main bases for collection and redistributing revenue: origin and population. 
While the origin base (returning revenue to the locality where it was collected) failed to take into 
account the local need factor, redistribution by the population principle could be effective in terms 
of “need.” Yet, the extent of redistribution depended on state political bargains and most of the 
taxes in question were distributed on an origin basis (Wueller 1933, p. 38).
9 It is possible that greater unemployment also generated greater transfers via the unemployment 
insurance scheme. Yet, by 1931, the period of eligibility for unemployment relief was drastically 
restricted and nearly all people under 21 years were excluded from welfare benefits. These 
measures were offset by the end of 1931 somewhat with greater relief payments and a partial 
rollback of the exclusion (Balderston 1993).
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Political affinity to Brüning’s policies might have mattered, but in 
essence, spending cuts were mandated at the central level. The room 
to maneuver in the states was also highly constrained. States could no 
longer borrow on international capital markets after 1930, and only a 
small share of state spending was accounted for by local tax revenue over 
which a state had control. While local politicians could potentially shift 
spending between categories, the Reich increasingly dictated the way in 
which states should spend money; put caps on spending categories; and, 
in many instances, relied heavily on targeted Reich subsidies or transfers. 
Thus, states were also constrained both by an inability to legislate tax rates 
and by the traditional ways of redistributing tax revenue. Our bottom line 
is that responding to the recession with discretionary spending was not 
much of a possibility and both income tax10 and expenditure were largely 
out of the hands of state governments and local authorities.11
DATA
We collected data from official German sources (see our Online Data 
Appendix for details and Galofré-Vilà et al. (2020)). Our analysis begins by 
measuring the impact of austerity on electoral outcomes at the city level. Data 
on electoral returns for the Reichstag elections are from the official publica-
tion Statistik des Deutschen Reiches (volumes Wahlem zum Reichstag), with 
all the other data at the city level coming from the Statistisches Jahrbuch 
Deutscher Städte, which report data for cities above 50,000 inhabitants (N 
= 98). For each city, we collected city spending data for each fiscal year 
from 1929/30 to 1932/33, which includes transfers from higher levels of 
government and spending by budget category, in 1,000 RM. Such detailed 
data at the city level allow us to look at the type of spending and the poten-
tial mechanisms by which spending changes can affect electoral outcomes. 
The fiscal years ran from 1 April to 31 March, and when we say 1929, this 
refers to the fiscal year 1929/30. We also collected data from the federal 
transfers to cities (a variable called Überweisungen aus Reichsteuern) to 
construct a Bartik-style instrument, as discussed subsequently. 
To test competing explanations, we further used data on city-level 
unemployment. Unemployment is defined as the number of people in the 
labor force not working and registered in the local offices as unemployed. 
We proxy city economic conditions by the construction of new residential 
10 Income tax was a key tax in the Weimar revenue system (with 20 percent of total revenue).
11 Here, Newcomer (1936, p. 205) comments that “it is unfortunate that the equalizing factors 
adopted have been vitiated in a number of instances by guarantees of pre-war income.” See also 
Wueller (1933, p. 36).
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apartment buildings. We also collected mortality data from the bulletins 
of the Reichs-Gesundheitsblatt. These bulletins report detailed mortality 
data at the weekly level for cities with a population larger than 100,000 
inhabitants (N = 51).
We also study district- (kreis-) level data (N = 1,024), where data 
on taxes, but not spending, are available. Electoral and fiscal data on 
taxes are from the official Statistik des Deutschen Reiches. For taxes, we 
collected data on the number of taxpayers, total taxable income, and total 
revenue for each state (in 1,000 RM) on two main federally administered 
income taxes: the lohnsteuer, a withholding tax deducted at the source, 
and the einkommenssteuer, an ex-post income declaration tax only paid 
by middle and high rate payers. For the “wage tax” (lohnsteuer), data 
are available in 1928/29 and 1932/33, and for the “income tax” (einkom-
menssteuer) for the years 1928/29, 1929/30, and 1932/33 (Dell 2007). 
Despite missing data for some years, the available years allow us to 
capture the main changes in taxation in the period of interest (September 
1930–March 1933), and rather than having highly temporally disaggre-
gated data, we rely on benchmark years under the assumption that the 
impact of austerity is cumulative. We also collected state-level data on 
taxes (the lohnsteuer and einkommenssteuer) for the same years as in the 
district sample.12
From the statistical abstracts Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche 
Reich, we collected state-level data on spending, unemployment (number 
of people in the labor force not working), an index of hourly wages,13 and 
a proxy economic output (generation of electricity, in 1,000 kWh). For 
the latter one, we use a proxy based on electricity generation, as these 
two correlate closely, since the vast majority of goods and services are 
produced using electricity. Other district-level data used in the Online 
Data Appendix, such as the number of welfare recipients, are from Statistik 
des Deutschen Reiches (volume Die Öffentliche Fürsorge im Deutschen 
Reich). Table A1 reports the main summary statistics on key variables. 
On the magnitude of austerity, as Figure 1 shows, between 1930 and 
1932, state-level real expenditure was cut by 8 percent (nominal total 
spending fell by about 25 percent) and Reich level real expenditure fell by 
14 percent (30 percent nominal).14 These were not insignificant compo-
nents of aggregate demand since, together, state and Reich expenditure 
totaled close to 30 percent of GDP in 1928/29.
12 For simplicity, when we say states, we also mean Prussian provinces.
13 We created a state-level index of nominal wages averaging the monthly data from the 
hourly wages paid in four occupations (construction, wood, and skilled and unskilled workers in 
metallurgy) in 38 large cities that are located within each of the states.
14 The spending data include transfers to other public authorities. 
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NAzI SUPPORT AND CITY-LEVEL SPENDING
With the launch of austerity in July 1930, the number of votes for 
the Nazi Party soared from 6 to 14 million between the elections of 
September 1930 and July 1932. Indeed, as Figure 2 suggests, there is a 
close negative association between the increase in the Nazi vote share 
between September 1930 and July 1932 and the change in city-level 
spending between 1929/30 and 1930/31. We next explore these issues 
more rigorously and implement some empirical strategies to limit biases 
due to endogeneity. 
Results
We begin our analysis reporting the results of statistical models where 
the dependent variable is the level of the Nazi vote share across cities in 
federal elections. We use city fixed effects throughout so that we rely 
fiGure 1
DEVELOPMENT OF REAL PER CAPITA STATE SPENDING IN GERMANY,  
1926/27–1932/33 (1926/27 = 100)
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of real per capita government spending between 1926/27 
and 1932/33. Nominal state-level expenditure is as reported in James (1986) following fiscal 
years and accounting for transfers to other public authorities. Data were originally collected from 
Official Statistics (Statistiches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich). Nominal expenditure has been 
adjusted for inflation using the price index (1913/14 = 100) from Jürgen Sensch in HISTAT-
Datenkompilation online (Preisindizes für die Lebenshaltung in Deutschland 1924 bis 2001) 
and for population using the data from Piketty and zucman (Data Appendix for Capital is Back, 
Table DE1).
Source: See the text.
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on within-city variation to identify the impact of austerity on Nazi vote 
share. With these specifications, our models yield a difference-in-differ-
ences with an intensity of treatment interpretation based on
NAZIct = α + β1 ln (Expendituresct) + β2 ln (Unemploymentct) 
+ β3 ln (Outputct) + µc + δt + ect ,
(1)
where c is a city, t indexes elections, and NAZI denotes the vote share 
of the Nazi Party as measured by the ratio of the number of votes to 
the Nazi Party over the total number of (valid) votes cast. Expendituresct 
comprises all categories of city expenditure, Unemploymentct is the 
number of registered unemployed in a city, Outputct is our proxy for 
economic output in a city, and ect is an error term. These control variables 
are expressed in natural logarithms.15 We standardize data to have a mean 
of zero and a standard deviation of one so coefficients across models are 
directly comparable. We also include city fixed effects (µc) and fixed 
effects for the calendar years of 1932 and 1933 (δt). We report standard 
errors clustered at the administrative division level. There are 44 clusters, 
and by clustering at the administrative division (above the city level), we 
fiGure 2
CHANGES IN VOTE FOR THE NAzI PARTY AND CITY-LEVEL SPENDING,  
1930–1932
Notes: Data on the y-axis are the difference in the vote share going to the Nazi Party between 
the elections of September 1930 and July 1932. The x-axis shows the change in total city-level 
government spending in percentage points (left figure) and the change in health and well-being 
city-level government spending (right figure) in percentage points. The p-value in the right figure 
is equal to 0.040 (r = –0.249) and in the left figure is equal to 0.009 (r = –0.320).
Source: See the text.
15 We use the values of city-level government spending for fiscal year 1929/30 for the election 
of September 1930, values for 1931/32 for the elections of July and November 1932, and values 
of 1932/33 for the election of 1933.
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allow for arbitrary spatial correlations of the error term within the cluster. 
Additionally, many of the variables were decided above the city level and 
fixed effects already pick up potential spatial correlations.
In Table 1 (Column (2)), we show that a one-standard-deviation increase 
in the natural logarithm of spending is associated with a decrease in Nazi 
vote share (in standard deviation terms) of –0.42 (95 percent confidence 
interval (CI): from –0.68 to –0.15). This specification, which pools data 
for the four elections between 1930 and 1933, is robust to the inclusion 
of administrative division or state by period fixed effects (Columns (3) 
and (4)).16 These last specifications control for time-varying unobserv-
able shocks or arbitrary unobserved trends at the administrative division 
or state level. Since shocks are likely to be highly spatially correlated, 
these controls mop up the effect of spending changes after controlling for 
local economic and political shocks. 
table 1
IMPACT OF CITY EXPENDITURES ON THE NAzI PARTY VOTE SHARE,  
ALL NATIONAL ELECTIONS 1930–1933





















Number of observations 260 260 260 260
City-level fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effect 1932 Yes Yes No No
Fixed effect 1933 Yes Yes No No
State × period fixed effects No No Yes No
Admin. division × period fixed effects No No No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the percentage share (×100) of the valid votes cast going to the Nazi 
Party in the different elections. Equation (1) is equivalent to the results we show in Column (2). 
We use the controls of 1929 for the election of September 1930, 1931 for the elections of July and 
November 1932, and 1932 for the election of March 1933. We estimate the linear models with 
many levels of fixed effects, as in Correia (2017). We balance the sample for singleton groups and 
use a balanced panel with robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on 44 administrative 
divisions. We standardize all variables with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. ***p 
< 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Source: See the text.
16 Specifically, we interact state and administrative division level fixed effects with an indicator 
for each year 1932 and 1933. 
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This table also displays the results for other competing explanations 
for the rise of the Nazi Party. Despite the fact that the coefficient on 
unemployment at the city-level displays a positive sign, it is only statisti-
cally significant in Column (4). As Ferguson (1997, p. 267) notes, this 
is a likely outcome, as “it is a popular misconception that because high 
unemployment coincided with rising Nazi support, the unemployed must 
have voted for Hitler. Although some did, unemployed workers were 
more likely to turn to Communism than to Nazism.” When controlling 
for austerity and unemployment, in most cases, the economic output vari-
able is also not statistically significant.
Since we can differentiate party votes in the data, we next modify the 
outcome variable to be the vote share among other parties. This change 
allows us to see how austerity affected the rest of the German political 
spectrum. To also show that our results are not driven by a single elec-
tion (or group of elections), we provide the results in three separate forest 
plots, pooling data for the elections of 1930 and 1933; elections of 1930 
and 1932 (both elections); and the four elections between 1930 and 
1933. 
Results for the Nazi Party in Figure 3 show that there is a negative 
and statistically significant association between spending and the Nazi 
Party vote share in the different elections between 1930 and 1933. 
Results for the other parties suggest that austerity mostly drew votes 
from the Center Party. This is not surprising as the Center Party was 
Brüning’s party and the party became very unpopular for consolidating 
the budget. For instance, Straumann (2019, p. 207) comments that “the 
harsh austerity measures of December 1931 … pushed the popularity of 
the Brüning cabinet down to a new low.” Results also display a positive 
sign for the SPD (although not always statistically significant) and the 
Communist Party (when avoiding the violent election of 1933). Results 
for the DNVP highlight its lack of a political position on the austerity 
front. 
Robustness Checks
In Table A2, we also pool all elections and study the dynamics of the 
effects via interaction terms. Specifically, we interacted the spending 
data with a dummy for each election. Therefore, we estimated three coef-
ficients, 7/1932, 11/1932, and 1/1933, and then one for austerity unin-
teracted, which corresponds to the “omitted” category, which is 1930. 
In this way, we show that the austerity effect is stable across time, as 
the sample is kept stable and the reference point still remains 1930. 
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We further test for the validity of our estimates in different ways.17 For 
instance, in Table A3, we divide each of the right-hand-side variables by 
population to show that our fixed effects models are very likely to proxy 
for a stable population over the short horizon between 1930 and 1933. 
17 We also used the data on the number of entries to the Nazi Party at the city level from 
Satyanath, Voigtländer, and Voth (2017) and explored the impact of austerity on joining the Nazi 
Party. Specifically, we looked at the log of the number of entries in the Nazi Party in the preceding 
year and focused on the inflow of people into the party rather than on the stock of party members. 
Using a specification equivalent to Equation (1) and pooling data from 1931 to 1933, the results 
strengthen the case that nationalist and racist ideals became more salient when compounded by 
austerity, driving people toward the Nazi ideology (Shirer 1960).
fiGure 3
IMPACT OF CITY EXPENDITURES ON THE NAzI PARTY VOTE SHARE,  
ELECTIONS 1930, 1932, AND 1933
Notes: Dependent variable is the percentage share (×100) of the valid votes cast going to the 
main parties in the different elections. Models are estimated independently and adjusted for 
unemployment and economic output. We use the controls of 1929 for the election of September 
1930, 1931 for the elections of July and November 1932, and 1932 for the election of March 1933. 
We use a balanced panel with robust standard errors clustered on 44 administrative divisions. 
SPD stands for the Social Democratic Party and DNVP for the German National People’s 
Party. In the election of 1933, the DNVP presented in the election as part of the Kampffront 
Schwarz-Weiß-Rot, which was an electoral alliance of three parties: the DNVP, the Stahlhelm, 
and Landbund. All models include city-level fixed effects, and the forest plot with the elections 
1930 and 1932 (both) includes a fixed effect for 1931/32 and “all elections” fixed effects for 1932 
and 1933. We standardized all variables with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
Source: See the text.
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Table A4 further explores the interaction of the shock of the Depression 
with social structure. We interacted year fixed effects with the share of 
blue-collar workers in 1925 and the share of the population identifying 
as Catholic or Protestant.18 The time interactions on religious identity 
are significant, suggesting a role for such interaction. However, austerity 
mattered in a similar way in Catholic and Protestant areas, though the 
impact is higher in places with a Jewish community.19
Instrumental Variable and Endogeneity
One may worry that changes in spending were choice variables reflecting 
the (unobservable) state of the underlying economy or the level of local 
political competition. Politicians could alter spending levels in response 
to these and their perceptions of these and other variables, making it prob-
lematic to infer the impact of exogenous changes in spending on votes 
for an extreme party such as the Nazis. To deal with the potential endo-
geneity of expenditures, we employ a shift share instrumental variable in 
the spirit of Aizer (2010), which relies on variation at the national level 
in “across-the-board” cuts imposed by Brüning. Consider the following 
stylized equation for total government spending G in city c in fiscal year t:
     Gct = GFct + GLct.     (2 )
Spending in city c is composed of two components. One is federal trans-
fers or the federally mandated level of spending GFct. This variable could 
also be construed as local spending based on local claims to federal revenue 
streams, where the subscript F denotes federal transfers or mandates to 
city c. The other component, GLct, is based on local decision-making and 
local revenues. Assuming that this spending is constant, the change in total 
spending between period t and period t – 1 given an (α – 1) percent change 




× (α −1). (3)
The absolute value of the percentage change in spending is directly 
related to the share of federal spending in total city spending. That is, 
18 Using Equation (1), we also split the sample for Prussian and non-Prussian cities and found 
that in both cases results are negative and statistically significant, with point estimates being 
larger in Prussian cities.
19 In Table A5, we also show that results hold when we control for the severity of the depression 
using data on the number of welfare recipients. While this variable might be colinear with 
spending, not controlling for spending but for the number of recipients suggests that expectations 
might also have mattered. People could also respond to perceived austerity rather than actual 
exposure to austerity.
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the larger the share of GFct–1 in Gct–1, the larger the percentage fall in 
total spending, (%∆Gct ), for a (α –1)% change in GFct–1. Our instrument, 
therefore, is the initial share of federal transfers in total city spending in 
1929 interacted with year indicators represented by δt , which themselves 
proxy for the across-the-board nationally imposed spending cuts. This 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach is reminiscent of Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2014) or Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012). 

















= 0 . In a 
broader survey on shift-share instruments, Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin, 






 are exogenous, the 
Bartik-style or shift-share instrument boils down to using initial shares 
(interacted with time dummies) as excluded instruments. With two 
sectors, they also show it is only necessary to use one sector share and 
this is equivalent to a Bartik approach. To satisfy the exclusion restric-
tion, one would have to believe that reliance on the central government 
in 1929 was not related to the unobservables driving the change in Nazi 
vote share. As suggested by Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin, and Swift 
(2020), we tested this by regressing the initial share on observables such 
as the share of Protestants and Catholics, levels of unemployment, or the 
construction of new buildings. In none of the cases were these variables 
statistically significant. For relevance, the log deviation in spending from 
the within-city mean must be correlated with the initial dependency on 
the Reich transfers. This would evidently be true unless local spending 
changes completely offset (orthogonal) Reich spending changes. This is 
not possible since localities could not fund spending by borrowing due to 
financial market dislocation and due to the fact that total tax revenue was 
falling as a result of the decline in aggregate activity. 
As Table 2 shows, using ordinary least squares (OLS), the impact 
in terms of standard deviations in vote share for the Nazi Party asso-
ciated with a one-standard-deviation increase in the percentage change 
in spending is –0.78 (95 percent CI: from –1.21 to –0.34) in the elec-
tions of 1930 and 1932 (both) and –0.55 (95 percent CI: from –0.77 to 
–0.34) when considering all elections.20 Results using 2SLS are just 15 
percent larger (in absolute magnitude) than the OLS results in Column 
20 We also checked for linearity, categorizing the spending data into bins and including the 
dummy variables for the bins in the model. We also explored this with bins of different sizes in 
the spending data. The assumption of linearity is largely suitable.
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(4), showing that OLS results may not be highly biased. In Table A6, we 
also show the Bartik results using models in differences. 
Mechanisms
In Figure 4, we modify Equation (1) and, instead of all city-level 
expenditure, we study the impact of changes in different types of expen-
diture. Interestingly, most of the effect of austerity is driven by spending 
changes in health and well-being (–1.03: 95 percent CI: from –1.53 to 
–0.52) and housing (–0.21: 95 percent CI: from –0.39 to –0.03). These 
were among the budgets most affected by austerity.21 The size of the effect 
for spending changes in health and well-being is 32 percent higher than 
table 2
IMPACT OF CITY EXPENDITURES ON THE NAzI PARTY VOTE SHARE USING  
A BARTIK INSTRUMENT, NATIONAL ELECTIONS 1930, 1932, AND 1933
Elections 1930 and 1932 (Both) All Elections
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS

























F-test excluded instrument 14.16 20.69
Rubin–Anderson test (p-value) 0.017 0.042
Number of cities 231 231 308 308
City-level fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effect 1931/32 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effect 1932/33 No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the percentage share (×100) of the valid votes cast going to the main 
parties in the different elections. We use the controls of 1929 for the election of September 1930, 
1931 for the elections of July and November 1932, and 1932 for the election of March 1933. 
The first-stage coefficient on the initial average income tax rate is negative and highly significant 
(–0.103; p-value = 0.000; 95 percent CI: –0.129 to –0.077). We use a balanced panel with standard 
errors clustered on 44 administrative divisions. For details on the instrument, refer to the text. All 
models include time and city-level fixed effects. We standardize all variables with a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of one. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Source: See the text.
21 As noted by Straumann (2019, p. 70) on the Second Emergency Decree, “the plan proposed 
a series of spending cuts, notably of health insurance compensations and of revenues apportioned 
to states and municipalities.”
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the overall effects of the spending changes presented in the previous table, 
showing that social spending changes plausibly exacerbated the suffering 
of the German masses. There is also a positive effect of expenditure in 
construction and the Nazi vote share between the elections of September 
1930 and 1933. As we have already seen, by the end of 1932, von Papen 
and Schleicher introduced some tax discounts as well as construction and 
work programs, which, along with Hitler’s promise to construct an auto-
bahn, were symbols of a new era of economic competence and the end 
of austerity (Voigtländer and Voth 2019). However, the effect disappears 
when we introduce data for the austerity years and the elections of 1932.
The literature also stresses that Brüning’s fiscal plans were part of a polit-
ical strategy to elicit international sympathy for German suffering, putting 
fiGure 4
IMPACT OF CITY EXPENDITURES BY BUDGET CATEGORY ON THE NAzI PARTY 
VOTE SHARE, ELECTIONS 1930, 1932, AND 1933
Notes: Dependent variable is the percentage share (×100) of the valid votes cast going to the 
Nazi Party in the different elections. Models are estimated independently and adjusted for 
unemployment and economic output. We use the controls of 1929 for the election of September 
1930, 1931 for the elections of July and November 1932, and 1932 for the elections of March 1933. 
We use a balanced panel with robust standard errors clustered on 44 administrative divisions. All 
models include city-level fixed effects, and the forest plot with the elections 1930 and 1932 (both) 
includes a fixed effect for 1931/32 and “all elections” fixed effects for 1931/32 and 1932/33. We 
standardized all variables with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
Source: See the text.
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an end to WWI reparations.22 Coinciding with the fiscal retrenchment, 
mortality rates, which had been declining, started to rise rapidly after 1932. 
One mechanism for the rise of populist parties is that they gain the most 
votes where health fares worst. This link was outlined by some commenta-
tors at the time. For instance, by the fall of October 1930, Hjalmar Schacht 
(former head of the Reichsbank) gave an interview to the American press 
saying that, “If the German people are going to starve, there are going to be 
many more Hitlers” (The New York Times, 3 October 1930).
Next, we report suggestive evidence that the effect of spending cuts 
was through the channel of higher mortality. In Table 3, we use Equation 
(1) and also add a control for mortality. Since we use city fixed effects, 
mortality here can be interpreted as excess mortality, that is, within-city 
changes or deviations of mortality from its within-sample mean. Instead of 
overall spending, we use only spending in health and well-being. Column 
(1) shows that after controlling for unemployment and economic output 
and other fixed effects, increases in spending are negatively and statisti-
cally related to Nazi Party vote. Similarly, Column (2) shows that without 
controlling for spending, higher mortality is associated with higher Nazi 
vote share. However, once we add the mortality control (Column (3)), 
expenditure is no longer statistically significant and the size of the coef-
ficient declines by 34 percent. If we remove the deaths from cancers and 
a category for ill-defined causes, the coefficient for mortality remains 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level of confidence (Column (5)), 
but the coefficient on spending declines by more than half and is not 
statistically significant. Although results are weaker for infant mortality, 
possibly because births to the poorest families fall disproportionately 
during a recession (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney 2004), they display a low 
p-value (Column (7)). This result further illustrates that the impact of 
austerity was potentially channeled through suffering (as measured by 
changes in mortality). It is also interesting that the coefficients on unem-
ployment and economic output, once we control for austerity, are similar 
before and after we include the mortality control.
NAzI SUPPORT AND DISTRICT-LEVEL TAXES
Results
We next move to district-level data. Since spending data at the district 
level are unavailable from national sources, we rely on within-district 
22 This strategy was never a clear political winner and soon lacked an economic rationale. By 
June 1931, the Hoover Moratorium had suspended Germany’s WWI debts for one year. A year 
later, in July 1932, reparations were permanently postponed at the Lausanne Conference.
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variation in income taxes as our measure of austerity. We assume that 
for an individual voter, changes in taxes have an impact analogous, if not 
proportional, to cuts in spending. Both fiscal variables would presum-
ably have an economic and potentially psychic impact on the well-being 
and political preferences of an individual voter. Changes in tax rates 
would alter an agent’s budget constraint and choices much the same as 
a direct change in income due to modifications of targeted transfers or 
other government spending on services. Alternatively, utility derived from 
public good flows could also be altered to the extent that public goods are 
a function of spending or the revenue that is necessary to finance such 
spending.
We model the impact of austerity on Nazi vote share using the following 
equation:
   NAZIdt = β1 ln (Tax Rate (a))dt + β2 ln (Wagesst)     (4)
+ β3 ln (Unemploymentst) + β4 ln (Outputst) + µd + δt + edt, 
where the average Tax Rate (either the average rate of income or wage 
taxes and denoted by a) is calculated as the ratio of tax revenue divided 
by total declared taxable income. Tax rates are indexed by districts d, 
other controls by states s, and t is an election period (September 1930, 
July 1932, November 1932, or March 1933). Since we do not have annual 
data on taxes, we linked the income taxes for the fiscal year 1929/30 to 
the elections of September 1930 and the taxes for the fiscal year 1932/33 
to the elections of 1932 and 1933. Since wage taxes are unavailable for 
the fiscal year 1929/30, we had to link the wage taxes for 1928/29 to the 
elections of 1930 and the taxes for 1932/33 to the elections of 1932 and 
1933. NAZI denotes the percentage point vote share of the Nazi Party 
in the different federal elections. We also include district fixed effects 
(µd) and a fixed effect for the fiscal year 1932/33 (δt) and report standard 
errors clustered at the district and state levels.
The results in Table 4 (Column (1)) show that the impact in terms of 
standard deviations in vote share for the Nazi Party associated with a 
one-standard-deviation rise in the natural logarithm of the average tax 
rate is 0.16 using income taxes (95 percent CI: from 0.78 to 0.25) and 
0.19 using wage taxes (95 percent CI: from 0.09 to 0.30). This result 
suggests that the Nazi Party received more votes in districts with greater 
austerity when austerity is measured as rises in the tax rate.
To control for endogeneity, we also instrumented the tax rate with the 
level of the average income tax rate in 1928 (Column (7)) interacted with 
time dummies. The percentage change in the average income tax rate T 
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is the weighted average of statutory rates with the weights equal to the 
share of total taxable income within each tax bracket. Assuming constant 
shares, the observed percentage change in the average tax rate, denoted 
by T̂ for district d in period t, is given by
T̂dt = ∑bω db τ̂ bt , (5)
where the weights, ωdb, are the ratio of total taxable income in bracket b 
to total taxable income across all brackets in an initial year and τbt values 
are the nationally defined statutory tax rates for each bracket. 
In 1930, under austerity, statutory income tax rates for each bracket 
were raised equally nationwide. The change in the average depends on 
the initial shares. As Pinkham-Goldsmith, Sorkin, and Swift (2020) show, 
the relevant Bartik-style instrument for this national shock to tax rates 
with b shares and one time period is equivalent to using the initial shares 
as instruments. The average income tax rate in 1928 is, again, the sum of 
these shares (at the district level), with each share being multiplied by the 
same constant, τb1928 (the 1928 statutory tax rate), across all districts. We 
use this initial value (interacted with period fixed effects) as the excluded 
instrument. The first stage coefficient on the excluded instrument, the 
initial average income tax rate, is negative and statistically significant. 
The negative sign is due to the fact that the statutory tax rates rose more in 
proportional terms for the lowest tax brackets than the higher tax brackets. 
Using the initial average income tax rate as an excluded instrument, 
we find a positive relationship between changes in tax rates and Nazi vote 
share (Column (7)). Results are not dependent on clustering at the district 
level or at the state level. Nevertheless, the sizes of the standardized coef-
ficients using the instrumental variables (IV) are between two and three 
times larger than those using OLS, and since wage taxes were unavailable 
for 1929/30, we cannot use this instrument for wage taxes. There is no 
obvious reason why the point estimate on taxes using the IV approach is so 
much larger than in OLS. However, there is a possibility of some hetero-
geneity in the impact of tax increases such that the nationally imposed tax 
changes had a much larger impact in certain kinds of districts.
In Table A7, we also use a differenced model. We further show that 
results are robust to the addition of state fixed effects, which allows 
for differential state-level trends and potentially mops up some of the 
within-state correlations in the error term.23 In Column (4), we weight the 
23 Results for income (0.13; 95 percent CI: from 0.07 to 0.19) and wage taxes (0.09; 95 percent 
CI: from 0.04 to 0.15) are also statistically significant at 1 percent level of confidence using 
administrative division fixed effects.
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regressions by the level of population to emphasize the data from the larger 
districts and states and eliminate undue influence from smaller states. In 
Columns (5) and (6), we also add the lagged Nazi vote share to control 
for differential growth based on initial Nazi support in 1930. Lagged 
values refer to the election immediately prior to the latest election in the 
differenced dependent variable. Again, results are also very stable across 
specifications.
In Table A8, we explore potential heterogeneity in the impact of 
austerity. Here, we split the sample for values above and below the 
median vote share for the Nazi Party in the election of 1928 and the 
median values for the share of the labor force that is in agriculture, in 
industry, in civil service, self-employed, and in blue-collar occupations 
using the census data of 1925. When we stratify the sample, we show that 
the impact of austerity had a larger effect in pre-1930 Nazi strongholds; 
in districts with a low share of blue-collar workers; in rural, agricultural, 
and less industrialized areas; and in localities with a higher share of civil 
servants and self-employed workers. It seems that austerity was a bigger 
determinant for those living in small towns or the countryside and those 
who were self-employed, rather than residents of the largest cities who 
were more likely to become unemployed, who turned to the Communist 
Party. 
Robustness Checks
We pursued a number of additional robustness checks. In Figure A2, 
we drop one state at a time to show that our results are not driven by a 
particular state. In Table A9, we also study the impact of taxes on the vote 
shares for the main political parties. Additionally, in Table A10, we use 
first differences to calculate the taxes as the percentage point change (the 
change in the level) instead of the percentage change in average income 
and wage tax rates. 
For another robustness check, we use a policy discontinuity design at 
state borders—a method which uses a potentially more relevant set of 
control groups.24 For each election our border district-pair data are orga-
nized to have at least two observations in each pair p (one for each state 
in the pair). A given district appears in the data k times (for each election 
t) if it borders k districts. In total, there are 459 districts that lie along a 
state border, and for each border district, we match all the neighboring 
24 For a review of this methodology, see Dube et al. (2010), Holmes (1998), and Galofré-Vilà 
(2020). 
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districts that are located on opposite sides of the borders, yielding a total 
of 1,080 border pairs.25 The district-pair match on the opposite side of a 
state border is a plausible control group, since while there are substan-
tial differences in treatment intensity of austerity, due to differing state-
level policies and initial conditions, these pairs are very similar politi-
cally and economically and, approaching the border, most controls vary 
smoothly but the treatment variable jumps (Table A11). Hence, varia-
tion in austerity at the district level across state borders would be due to 
differences in state-level decisions on austerity.
Our difference-in-differences specification is as follows:
      NAZIdt = α + β1 ln Surplus (a)st + β2 ln Wagesst  (6)
+ β3 ln Unemploymentst + β4 ln Outputst + µp/pt + δt + edt, 
where NAZI denotes the Nazi Party vote share in district d in year t. To 
unite spending and taxes in the same equation, we measure austerity as 
the fiscal Surplus: the logarithm of the total state income taxes paid minus 
the logarithm of state-level expenditure. We use income and wage taxes 
in alternative specifications indexed by a. Using a higher level of aggre-
gation than the district for spending and taxes makes variation in treat-
ment more plausible since state changes are determined by within-state 
factors. Additionally, spending data are only available at the state level. 
Along with the standard controls as in previous equations, we use district 
(µd), time fixed effects (δt), or district pair by year effects and cluster the 
standard errors at the state and district pair level. This level of clustering 
also accounts for potential mechanical spatial correlations given the pres-
ence of districts in multiple pairs. In Table 5, we provide four types of 
specifications according to whether we use district-pair fixed effects (µp) 
or district-pair fixed effects by year interactions (µpt).
We find that the variable Surplus for the border-pair sample is also 
positive and statistically significant. For instance, a time-varying district-
pair fixed effects model using Surplus 1 gives a standardized coefficient 
of 0.28 (95 percent CI: from 0.15 to 0.42) and using Surplus 2 a coeffi-
cient of 0.23 (95 percent CI: from 0.06 to 0.40). This well-identified piece 
of variation, comparing neighboring districts that straddle state borders, 
produces consistent results with the full sample. In Table A12, we also 
obtain consistent results by instrumenting the percentage change in the 
average tax rate with the initial level of taxes paid in 1928 using district-
pair and state-level clustering along with district-pair fixed effects.
25 Missing data reduce somewhat the sample size from these numbers. 
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CONCLUSION
This paper offers econometric support for the idea that the austerity 
measures implemented between 1930 and 1932 immiserized and radi-
calized the German electorate. Each one-standard-deviation increase 
in austerity measured in several different ways was associated with 
between one-quarter to one-half of one standard deviation of the depen-
dent variable. Yet, austerity is only one factor affecting the rise of the 
Nazi Party and there are other factors at work such as the role of German 
business (Ferguson and Voth 2008), the historical roots of antisemitism 
(Voigtländer and Voth 2012), the influence of social capital (Satyanath, 
Voigtländer, and Voth 2017), the banking collapse (Doerr et al. 2018), 
and the power of radio propaganda (Adena et al. 2015). 
Austerity worsened the situation of low-income households and the 
Nazi Party became very efficient at channeling the austerity-driven 
German suffering and mass discontent. We exploit this mechanism by 
showing that austerity was associated with higher mortality. This rein-
forces the idea that, had Brüning relaxed the efforts to consolidate the 
budget, things might have been different.
The corollary seems clear: Even when the particular history of a country 
precludes a populist extreme-right option, austerity policies are likely to 
produce an intense rejection of the established political parties, with the 
subsequent dramatic alteration of the political order. The case of Weimar, 
explored in this paper, provides a timely example that imposing too much 
austerity and too many punitive conditions cannot only be self-defeating, 
but can also unleash a series of unintended political consequences, with 
truly unpredictable and potentially tragic results.
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